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The Veil of Esteem: On Seeing
Oneself Being Seen (Part Two:
Riddle and Accident)
Melba Hoffer1

Abstract
This article is the second of a three-part series entitled: The Veil of Esteem: On Seeing Oneself Being Seen. Inspired by Walter
Benjamin’s “reflection through vignette” method, the author inquires into the notions and interconnections between
memory and esteem. Esteem is the truth of oneself through the eyes of the other, and any truth of esteem must be told
from the perspective of that other, through the spectating other. Thus, the author finds that any story of esteem is veiled.
This second part, Riddle and Accident, explores unconditional love as maintained without the merit-worthy, yet it is its esteem
that catalyzes it. The story is narrated not as a representation of a person or of people but the discourse through which
the author has been lent her voice. The author is the translator through whom she is now speaking. The translator is the
producer of the discourse that suffocates her and allows her to breathe in gasped breaths, the producer of the discourse
that both takes away her voice and gives her voice. The first part of this series, Fragment/Never Thinking of Tomorrow, appears
in International Review of Qualitative Research, Volume 5, Issue 1; the third part, A Loan, appears in Qualitative Inquiry, Volume
18, Issue 4.
Keywords
Esteem, ethics

To see oneself is to see through the eyes of the other, but this
other is not another who stands outside of one’s own mind.
This other is the other through which one is oneself, through
which one is made oneself. I am but a fiction, as is she. This
is not to say that we are not. We are indeed, but the we presented here are a fiction insofar as all truth must be told as a
fiction, for all told truth has the structure of narration. Narration must be narrated from a point of view. One might have
chosen to narrate the truth of oneself through the first person,
but the first-person narrator cannot tell the story of esteem.
Esteem is the truth of oneself through the eyes of the
other, and any truth of esteem must be told from the perspective of that other, through the spectating other. Thus,
any story of esteem is veiled. The truth of one self is always
hidden to oneself when esteem is concerned, for there is no
such thing as self-esteem. Esteem must come from the other
who is in one’s own mind. What is mistaken for self-esteem
is but a translation of the dis-course of desire. And it’s for
this reason that I must write of her. And who, exactly, am I?
I am not one person, nor am I an amalgamation of people
who have loved her. I’m not a representation of a person or
of people but the discourse through which she is a woman
longing for air. I have been lent her voice. I am the translator through which she is now speaking. The translator is the

producer of the discourse that suffocates her and allows her
to breathe in gasped breaths, the producer of the discourse
that both takes away her voice and gives her voice.
She herself is not who she is, though she is indeed
another who is. She must exist, but it must be that she
remains veiled to both of us who are presented in this discourse. She must remain veiled, and she is indeed veiled by
this discourse, which is not, in actuality, my own.

Riddle and Accident
Auspices
She’s very aware of the landscape. When I’m around her, I
can only be very aware of her. When we were sitting on her
porch, she pointed out a cardinal—or what must’ve been a
cardinal. I only saw a small red spot perched atop a wire.
As a child, I had a pair of binoculars. I received them on the
1
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pretense that I had wanted to watch birds. From time to
time, I’d use my gift as intended. Bird watching, however,
proved to be difficult. It seemed that the birds knew they
were being seen. I had convinced myself that watching
them made them fly away, but perhaps they flew away on
their own. As an adult, I’m not fully unconvinced. Still, I
think the ancients were right. With keen interpretation, how
the birds fly can tell you something.

Caesarean Birth
One of my favorite jazz vocalists is Beverly Kenney. Her
voice is special. It has sophistication, although if you’ve
heard it, you might describe it as girlish. This, however, is
only one side of Kenney’s voice, the surface. There’s
another side, a side of depth, a depth that’s perhaps best left
deep and undisturbed by those uninvited, a depth that
should be left on its side of the veil.
There’s a fascinating article about her by Jonathan
Schwartz from which I’ll quote liberally. It appeared in the
November 1992 issue of GQ. The title is ironic, referencing
the same quality one hears if one listens only superficially.
It’s called “Girl Singer.”
A friend, Millie Perkins, describes Kenney this way:
Everyday life was difficult for her. You see, she knew
things I didn’t know. She was the only person who
knew who I was inside. She was somehow haunted,
and at the same time so kind and so unselfish, with so
much patience for other people. She had an amazing
awareness of what the human condition really was.
Next, is the most touching description of a one-night
stand that I can imagine. It comes from Ivan Mogull, reminiscing at age 70:
Then Beverly and I went back to my apartment. We’d
never touched each other before. I was just knocked
out by her singing. We listened to music. I remember
exactly what we listened to. The guy was a Chilean
singer, Lucho Gatica. He really turned us on. And
Sinatra’s “Wee Small Hours.” And Nat’s “Love Is the
Thing.” And we listened to Charles Aznavour. And we
danced, and then Beverly took me by the hand. It was
the greatest night of my life. She was just so natural
and gifted. It wasn’t vulgar or anything. You know
something? One of the things I remember the most is
Beverly licking the rim of her glass. She did that all the
time, and she did it that night. That was our only night.
This is Kenney herself. It’s an unpublished poem:
On Cesarean [sic] Birth
I curled my body small

in hiding
to escape the view
of those who sought to start the flow
of waters long since overdue.
And watched in horror
Cautious silver
part the roof of my Capri
And heard the cry of anguished protest,
The first of many wrought from me.
It isn’t the subtlest poetry, but it isn’t awful. One gathers
that she couldn’t stand to be looked at. She has a point about
forced birth, though.
What I won’t quote, maybe because it bothers me, is the
stuff about her time with Milton Klonsky, the poet. He
inspired her, and she was deeply in love with him, but apparently he left her. There’s some speculation that this was the
reason for her suicide, but I think that this, too, is only the
truth of the surface. She used alcohol and sleeping pills.
Lastly, there are five photos in the article. She’s smiling
in all of them, but she looks to be at peace in only two.
There’s a picture of her on a beach, the only picture where
she’s looking far into the landscape rather than into the
camera. She’s looking, but not returning a look. The second
happy picture shows her arm in arm with George Shearing.
Shearing, of course, was blind.

Unforgettable
The exigency of the lost does not entail being remembered and commemorated; rather, it entails remaining
in us and with us as forgotten, and in this way and
only in this way, remaining unforgettable. (Agamben,
2005, p. 40)
If forgetting exists, it can’t be something accumulated,
something gathered together to form of a collection. Never
can I recite a litany of things that I’ve forgotten. But how is
it that the lost should remain with us as forgotten, for forgetting, it would seem, is something that doesn’t remain with
us? The lost can only do this if the lost object becomes for
us something unforgettable, and the unforgettable itself
must be an object that’s emptied of its qualities. The unforgettable object must be a shell, a surface, a veil that remains
after the object partitioned from us has gone away. The
unforgettable is the empty signifier, a mute signifier that
stands in for I know not what. The unforgettable is the
proper name belonging to an object. The proper name rigidly designates an object through a primal baptism, not
through a collection of descriptions. But what produces the
unforgettable?
Is it mourning that makes the lost object unforgettable?
No, for mourning is what disinvests us from the lost object.
Mourning doesn’t gut the object of its essence. It removes

Downloaded from csc.sagepub.com at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on May 20, 2013

89

Hoffer
the part of ourselves that we had put into the object. Is it
nostalgia that gives the lost object the status of being unforgettable? No, for nostalgia is a type of commemoration, an
act of memorializing. Furthermore, it installs the temporal
veil of used to be or has not yet been. This veil isn’t the
empty signifier of the unforgettable.
What makes something unforgettable is unconditional
love. The love object transforms into the unforgettable in
the midst of loss. And if the unforgettable must be an object
that’s emptied of its qualities, it must’ve been this way
before the occurrence of loss. There’s no need to empty the
qualities of an object that’s no longer accessible. In fact, if
the love object had not been emptied of its qualities at the
time of loss, this would be an obstruction to mourning.
Mourning empties the love object of one’s investment. To
take the qualities of the love object as what’s to be emptied
out is to be mistaken about how to mourn.
Unconditional love loves the love object without recourse
to its qualities. Unconditional love is the love of an idea of
the love object. But is this to disparage unconditional love?
Is this to make unconditional love but a nonsense? Not necessarily. To dismiss unconditional love as nonsense is to
misunderstand how it comes to be. Remember that though
unconditional love doesn’t have an object, unconditional
love is caused. That which is esteemed is the object cause of
unconditional love. Thus, though unconditional love is
caused by qualities, it doesn’t take those qualities as its
object. It loves the love object such as it is, as whatever it is.
It empties the qualities from the object insofar as loving the
object with all its qualities makes those qualities external to
the object. Unconditional love loves, but it can’t take the
object as an object, for its end is to perpetuate itself, not to
arrive and captivate. Unconditional love is maintained without the merit-worthy, yet it’s esteem that catalyzes it.
At bottom, unconditional love is there because one is
smart, attractive, and knows a joke about a panda. Those are
things that cause one to be unforgettable. And because those
qualities become external to the love object insofar as they
aren’t what maintain the love, it wouldn’t matter, for
instance, if one screws up the punch line and says that the
definition for panda reads that it eats leaves and shoots.

Symposium
And why all this longing for propagation? Because
this is the one deathless and eternal element in our
mortality. And since we have agreed that the lover
longs for the good to be his own forever, it follows
that we are bound to long for immortality as well as
for the good—which is to say that Love is a longing
for immortality. (Plato, Symposium, 1961, p. 207a)
Like a good Irish stout, ancient Greek drunk talk is really
heady. The head of this vignette is what Diotima teaches

Socrates about love. Love is a longing for immortality, and
this longing is fulfilled through propagation. In other words,
what forestalls death is perpetual birthing. But this doesn’t
really work. Although she claims that propagation is the one
deathless and eternal element in our mortality, it’s deathless
and eternal for humanity as a whole, not for any particular
human. This is to confuse the totality for what’s universal.
What all humans share is that their lives are a sum of forces
that resist death. So what can we say about love for the particular human?
If we’re to conceptualize love in terms of immortality,
we should take into account two important contravening
components constituting immortality. First, immortality in
the human is achieved only when the potential for death
has been exhausted. Second, if immortality is to be experienced deathlessly as Diotima suggests, then it must be
the experience of a nonbecoming being, the experience of
a being that’s changeless. The individual human can only
exhaust the potential for death by dying, but nonbecoming
can only be experienced by living through repetition. The
compulsive drives are the closest that these contravening
tendencies come to being resolved. The drives seek the
immortality of death and try to forestall the inevitable
through their repetitive, just-once-more, nature. It’s for
this reason that all drives are death drives. To blindly follow the drives is in some way to stop resisting death. Still,
the drives can’t achieve their end. It’s for this reason that the
drives are only ever partial. They’re partial because they
must take partial objects. Otherwise, they’d achieve the
death they aren’t supposed to. It’s in this way that the
drives differ from desire. Desire doesn’t take an object,
and unlike the plurality of drives, desire is unary. One
might describe the drives as longings, but desire isn’t
really a longing. Longings always take an object. The
drives can be longings because they do in fact have objects.
Desire, rather than being a longing, is often characterized
by an unanswered question, a riddle, an enigma. What is
this question? It’s the question of “Who am I for your
desire?” In what Diotima describes, the lovers don’t really
have a question. They know what they want, or at least
they’ll make concerted efforts in that direction: At bottom,
what Diotima offers isn’t a theory of love, but a theory of
the drives, a theory of sexuality.
It’s interesting, we might note, that the kind of sex that
can result in propagation can be an unnecessarily risky
behavior nowadays. Best not to get so drunk at symposia
lest we fail to remember this.

The Sphinx
What the Sphinx proposed was not simply something
whose signified is hidden and veiled under an “enigmatic”
signifier, but a mode of speech in which the original fracture of presence was alluded to in the paradox of a word
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that approaches its object while keeping it indefinitely at a
distance:
Like the Sphinx that utters it, the enigma belongs to
the sphere of the apotropaic, that is, to a protective
power that repels the uncanny by attracting it and
assuming it within itself. (Agamben, 1993a, p. 138)
Agamben is right here. Often, what’s focused on in the
myth of the Sphinx is her monstrousness, her cruelty of eating those who can’t answer her. This, however, is to miss
the point. The Sphinx is apotropaic, protective. It’s part of
the tragedy that Oedipus destroyed her by connecting the
signified to the signifier. Because of his destructive answer,
Oedipus left no one to protect Thebes in her absence.
Oedipus’ entrance into Thebes, of course, wasn’t exactly a
glorious homecoming.
One lesson we can learn is that it isn’t that the enigma
just veils in the hiding kind of way, but in the partitioning
way, and sometimes the enigma must be left intact as an
enigma. The enigma installs a necessary distance.
Sometimes distances are necessary. Without distance, for
instance, we wouldn’t be able to experience the aura of
nature. The will to truth isn’t always a virtue.

The Veil of Isis
For Nietzsche, to will the truth at all costs, to wish for
knowledge for its own sake, and to renounce vital
illusions would be to risk destroying humanity. The
will to truth is fundamentally a will to death. (Hadot,
2006, p. 286)
In the above passage, Pierre Hadot is reflecting on
Nietzsche’s own reflections on lifting the veil of nature.
Hadot’s book in general traces reformulations of a fragment
from Heraclitus, a fragment often translated as: “Nature loves
to hide.” Nietzsche equates nature with the Sphinx, and to lift
the veil of nature is to cause destruction, to break nature’s
most sacred laws. Of course, this is what Oedipus does.
Giving us a reading of the preface of The Gay Science,
Hadot tells us, “The refusal expressed there to unveil what
is hidden leads to the resolute decision to stick to that which
veils, that which is not hidden” (p. 291). Yet another lesson
we should take from Oedipus is that there’s a superficiality
the comes from a profundity, from an understanding that the
will to truth can be a will to death.

The Uniqueness of Commonality
In the Symposium Plato tells us about the full original
resonance of the word poiesis: “Any cause that brings
into existence something that was not there before is
poiesis.” Every time that something is pro-duced, that

is, brought from concealment and nonbeing into the
light of presence, there is poiesis, pro-duction, poetry.
(Agamben, 1999, pp. 59-60)
She has a Duchamp lithograph. When we were loading
her bicycle into my car, she had to take the front wheel off
to make it fit. I almost made a joke about her having a
reproduction of Duchamp’s Bicycle Wheel. I decided not
to on account that I had already failed with my misfired
joke about a Balzac who didn’t exist. Anyway, I’m wondering whether she wrote the poem she gave me on that
bike. She said she thought of it on her bike ride home, but
she has two. This one was a gift from an ex. But Duchamp’s
readymades.
The aura of an original work of art, the aura of the result
of an instance of poiesis, is a distance. There’s not only the
distance between the work of art and its spectator but also
the distance of the work of art to its origin. “Originality,”
Agamben notes, “means proximity to the origin. The work
of art is original because it maintains a particular relationship to its origin” (p. 61). If the aura of an original work of
art degrades in the mechanical reproduction, then the readymade, being something mechanically reproduced already,
inverts those distances. First, the proximity of the work of
art to its origin is transposed to the distance between the
spectator and the work of art. Being a common object,
there’s no ritualistic distance that we must keep to it. We’re
more proximate. However, the distance normally occurring
between the work of art and the spectator finds itself transposed to the space normally occupied by the work of art and
the proximity to its origin. Instead of this distance being a
close one, the readymade estranges itself from its origin.
In the readymade, Duchamp’s contribution was to
make poetry—poetry in the broad sense that we find it in
the Symposium—from the re-produced. In other words, he
pro-duced—brought to the light of presence something that
had remained partitioned away as concealed—something
that’s impossible to re-produce. Re-production is made
impossible because in order to produce the readymade, he
went round the screen. He brought forth something not
there from the side of the there already. The readymade isn’t
special. In some sense, it isn’t meant to be spectated, isn’t
meant to be looked at aesthetically. There can be no poetics
of the readymade.
Thus, the opposite of her lithograph, there can be no
mechanically reproduced readymade. The readymade is
unique because it’s common. Its uniqueness owes to the
context in which we find it. Namely, Duchamp took it from
the other side of the partition, put it on display, and thus
baptized it as art. And isn’t this what we find in singularity?
The singular has the same quality that makes the readymade
not a mere re-production, but an instance of poiesis. In the
singular, we find what we might call the uniqueness of
commonality.
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I’m Nuts About You | Whatever, I Love You
The Whatever in question here relates to singularity
not in its indifference with respect to a common
property, but only in its being such as it is. Singularity
is thus freed from the false dilemma that obliges
knowledge to choose between the ineffability of the
individual and the intelligibility of the universal.
The singularity exposed as such is whatever you
want, that is, lovable. Love is never directed toward
this or that property of the loved one, but neither
does it neglect the properties in favor of an insipid
generality. The lover wants the loved one with all of
its predicates, its being such as it is. (Agamben,
1993b, pp. 1-2)
In an oddly Lacanian way, Agamben opens The Coming
Community with the passage above. However, what he adds
is that not only is the unconditional love proper to desire not
directed toward this or that property of the loved one, but
the loved one is loved with all of its predicates. But what
can it mean that the loved one is loved with all of its
predicates?
Again, this can only mean that unconditional love doesn’t
have an object. Whatever being—the quodlibet ens—cannot
be an object, because that being is a being such as it is, a
being that has become what it is, whatever that is. Yes, it’s
still caused by smart, attractive, panda, but once it’s in
motion, unconditional love allows one to be smart, attractive, panda, and whatever. What Agamben writes about here
is the practice of unconditional love. We should note the
implication that unconditional love can’t be given to just
anyone. It’s different from, let’s say, a universal love for
humanity. Unconditional love is directed toward not this
insipid generality, but toward a singular being, a being such
as it is, toward a constellation of predicates.
The singular being is neither the individual nor the universal. Rather, it’s the exemplary, an example, an instance
having the potential of becoming a universal. The singular
is universalizable. It’s in this way that we should understand the uniqueness of commonality. It isn’t that commonality has uniqueness as one of its properties. Rather, in the
singular, uniqueness can come to belong to the gesture
toward the identification of a commonality. To think in
terms of Duchamp’s Bicycle Wheel, all one would have to
do is detach it from its stool, go round the screen again, and
attach it to her bike.

I’ll Remember All Winter Long
The early morning hike, the rented tandem bike, the
lunches that we used to pack. We never could explain
that sudden summer rain, the looks we got when we
got back. (“The Things We Did Last Summer”)

As I said, Beverly Kenney is one of my favorite vocalists,
but knowing how she died, I can’t listen to her work often.
Actually, I rarely get through an entire album. Still, I understand. She’s sophisticated. Her voice points to her wisdom, a
wisdom of which she has an excess. The wisdom is her veil,
and it’s this wisdom that splits her. It must’ve been painful,
and she seems to be the type to have suffered quietly. I
wouldn’t doubt that she would’ve mistaken concern for pity,
care for intrusion. You can hear that she’d rather not let people know her depth. Whether it’s not to be a burden or
because it makes her feel too exposed can only be unclear to
anyone who really listens, unclear because she herself is
confused. Still, in spite of herself, every syllable is a confession, even her silence, but again, only to those who can listen. And those who can listen must know to only listen.
She has a version of “The Things We Did Last Summer.”
Unlike other versions you’re likely to hear, she interprets it
correctly. It’s heartbreaking. Still, with Kenney gone in the
way she is, I prefer to listen to the indefatigably upbeat version that’s on the album Nancy Wilson cut with George
Shearing, The Swingin’s Mutual. Sure, Wilson’s interpretation is really pop friendly in the bad way, but in her absence,
Kenney’s rendition is unbearable.
It must be that when the special is thrust into something
nondialectical, into a completion in the terminal sense, thrust
into a nonpreserving destruction, the memory itself becomes
insufferable. The memorial of the recorded isn’t comforting,
but a reminder of a completion that cannot result in a collection. There’s not a gathering together into a unity, but the
opposite: the rending apart of what was also once singular into
fragments. One can only find comfort in the fantasy of being
able to forget, but we can’t help but know better. Mogull,
recall, was 70. At best there’s only not remembering.
I sometimes imagine what it might’ve been like to have
been close to her when she stopped resisting death. I’m not
necessarily talking about the night of her suicide. There are
many ways in which we stop resisting death. Suicide is just
one way among many. But what would I have done?
Panicked, I could panic. In desperation, I could plead
with her to live using the fact of her beauty as my appeal, but
she’s already convinced of it and is dying in spite of it. With
reflection, I could let her know that though I’d rather be
there for her birth, if this weren’t a possibility, I’d in any case
want to be there for her. And while this seems to be the
soundest response, it’s also the saddest. I might’ve done this.
Still, I would’ve told her some jokes first. I have many, a few
of them funny. I recently learned a good one about what one
should expect from engaging in bestiality with a panda.

Eats, Shoots, and Leaves
When all is said and done, I have more than one face.
I don’t know which is laughing at which. (Bataille,
1994, p. 68)
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The comic does not exist outside the pale of what is
strictly human. A landscape may be beautiful, charming and sublime, or insignificant and ugly; it will
never be laughable. Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion. I do not mean that we could not laugh at a
person who inspires us with pity, for instance, or even
with affection, but in such a case we must, for the
moment, put our affection out of court and impose
silence upon our pity. (Bergson, 2005, p. 2)
I love to hear her laugh. It had been a rare pleasure,
though. I wasn’t often able to elicit it from her. Inexplicably,
my usually charming self-deprecation had turned into sarcasm. Perhaps it was nervousness. I don’t know. Also, what
would’ve been otherwise good jokes—jokes that weren’t
mere snippiness—were ones making allusions to things that
don’t actually exist, things, for instance, like Henri de
Balzac. Yet she’s gracious, patient.
When I’ve heard her laugh, it’s genuine, tempered with
an almost imperceptible hesitation. It’s almost as though
she feels obliged to moderate her beauty, as though it would
be too overwhelming. In a way, it is. Her laughter is unforgettable. With regard to the expression on her visage, she
wrinkles her nose, both unforgettable and adorable. This is
the visage, but what of the laughing face? One would naturally have “more than one” for the reason that the face is
never captured by the accumulative, by collectible instances,
but by the amalgamated dissolved into totality.
If in the face, one exists singularly, existing while retaining all of one’s properties only as points of nonidentification, if in the face what comes to be exposed is the open
communicative potential behind which we hide and stay
hidden, then our question should be, “What is communicated by the laughing face?”
Laughter is a gesture. Gestures are generally indexes
pointing to the ineffable, but laughter as a gesture could
point to the fact that there’s nothing to say. The gesture of
laughter communicates not through symbolization but
through the natural index. Just as smoke indicates fire,
laughter indicates that communication has been able to
achieve its own inoperativity. Laughter points to an absence
of emotion, to the being without sentiment. A laughing face,
then is an indifferent one, indifferent in its expression—for
faces, remember, can have no expression—and indifferent
in its nondistinctive singularity. This isn’t at all the bad
indifference of refused desire. It’s the indifference of relief,
of having no need to articulate the question of desire
because one’s desire is matched by responsive, responsible
care from the lover. To have nothing to express is to exhale
stale air and to inhale the air of levity, the air unburdened
by emotion. Jokes may veil an unspeakable truth, but
laughter laughs out that truth. Through laughter there’s
escape. Laughter allows us to be born and to cultivate our

own growth. Laughter, at bottom, is the index of eudaimonia, of the nonaffective happiness constituting human
flourishing, the same happiness that is the most demanding
test of all for lovers.
I’m afraid that her rare laughter might’ve been something also pointing to her being full of sentiment, full of
invested emotional attunements that yielded no return.
Still, she hadn’t become bored with him. Instead, she had
waited and was herself consumed by what had burned her
and by what had burned in her. I couldn’t laugh for the
reason that I was also overwhelmed, not with pity, but
with concern.
Anyway, here’s something funny regarding one of her
favorite authorities, one who actually does exist. Maybe she
could use it as a title for something:
I see that I have Bourdieu, Pierre.

Naming and Necessity
The nature and character of a love is most sharply
defined by the fate that links it to someone’s name—
the person’s first name. In this sense the Divine
Comedy is nothing but the aura surrounding the name
of Beatrice, the most powerful representation of the
idea that all the forces and figures of the cosmos arise
from the name born of love. (Benjamin, “Short
Shadows—I,” 2005, p. 268)
What she finds in the man she loves is her image and
her name as a woman. Beatric. (Leclaire, 1998, p. 25)
To live in intimacy with a stranger, not in order to
draw him closer, or to make him known, but rather to
keep him strange, remote: unapparent—so unapparent that his name contains him entirely. (Agamben,
1995, p. 61)
Two people who are in love are attached above all
else to their names. (Walter Benjamin, One-Way
Street, 2004, p. 467)
1. Why the first name? This is the person’s proper
name. It isn’t the family name that one can share
with, let’s say, a linguist. It’s a rigid designator,
and if you’re familiar with Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, you know that rigid designators point to their referent without any reference
to qualities. Proper names are often common,
but the one iteration of it still rigidly designates.
The singularity stuff fits here well. So that whole
unconditional love thing? A shorthand for it could
be “I love you, Mel.” And oh yes, I’m writing you
a book, too. Yes, I know Divine Comedy is technically an epic poem.
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2. I think Leclaire is referencing the same thing
as above. But being the psychoanalyst that
he is—and sort of a Lacanian—he adds the
image. The image here is the one in the dualistic
imaginary—imaginary having nothing to do with
the imagination, but with the three orders of the
real, symbolic, and imaginary. The imaginary is
what’s at play in the mirror stage, hence the finding her image in the man she loves part. Remember
that whole, “What’s the color of a mirror” thing?
It was a riddle. I guess I’m sort of a Lacanian, too.
3. Uh-oh.
4. Not uh-oh.
5. Pellegrino
What is Aura? The experience of aura rests on the
transposition of a form of reaction normal in human
society to the relationship of nature to people. The
one who is seen or believes himself to be seen
[glances up] answers with a glance. To experience the
aura of an appearance or a being means becoming
aware of its ability [to pitch] to respond to a glance.
This ability is full of poetry. (Benjamin, 2007, p. 45)
The passage above is similar to what Benjamin will
claim in “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological
Reproducibility.” However, it’s taken from his archive.
Interestingly, these words are written on advertisement stationery for S. Pellegrino, and it’s hard not to interpret this as
at least minimally significant.
In “The Work of Art,” he notes the devaluation of the
here and now in the technologically reproduced, things such
as “a landscape moving past the spectator in a film”
(Benjamin, 2004, p. 254). With regard to the aura of nature
specifically, he writes:
The concept of the aura can be usefully illustrated
with reference to an aura of natural objects. We
define the aura as the unique apparition of a distance,
however near it may be. To follow with the eye a
mountain range on the horizon or a branch that casts
its shadow on the beholder is to breathe the aura of
those mountains, of that branch. (p. 255)
And what’s bottled mineral water but this same degradation? One can imagine drinking at the springs themselves.
No matter how close one gets to the natural object, it
remains distant. There’s always something just beyond our
vision, something that we may breathe—in our case,
drink—but not see. Nature remains veiled, remains on the
other side of the partition. But when we bottle the water, the
distance becomes degraded. The here and now of the springs
comes conveniently to us in a green bottle with a red star. S.
Pellegrino’s logo has apparently not changed. There can be

no exchange of glances with the bottled water for the reason
of the lack of distance. It’s too close to see.
But when aura remains, what of this ability that’s full of
poetry? It’s the poetry in the sense of poiesis. For instance,
becoming more aware of how she responded to my glance
did in fact bring forth what I’m now writing. She has her
own muse, but she’s mine. She’s my muse for the reason
that she’s hidden, for the reason that she’s in the distance
beyond the partition. Romanticism aside, I don’t want a
muse, but a fellow musician. The muses sing through you
because they dictate; a fellow musician breathes with you.
And when the breathing is in sync, there, too, is music—just
like Waldron and “Lady Day.”
Speaking of glances, though, she once asked me why I
kept offering her beers, the beers she herself bought, actually. Did I think it made her easy, she asked. No, beer always
makes me more handsome. Mutatis mutandis, I only needed
the mineral water, the mineral water she suggested I bring
for what was to be our missed beach rendezvous. Though I
usually prefer Perrier, for some reason I had chosen S.
Pellegrino.

The Muse
That a hiddenness be maintained in order that there
be disclosure, a forgetfulness maintained in order that
there be memory, this is inspiration, the rapture of the
muses which brings man, word, and thought into
accord with one another. But this hiddenness is also
the infernal core around which the obscurity of character and of destiny thickens; the non-said, growing
in thought, precipitates it into madness. (Agamben,
1995, p. 59)
Infernal indeed. Just as infernal as the first part of Divine
Comedy. Well, there’s always hope or getting drunk. Both
work. I shouldn’t have let her finish off so much of that beer.

30 and Singular
To love another being means to desire its species, that
is, to desire the desire with which it desires to persevere in its being. In this sense, special being is the
being that is common or generic, and this is something like the image or the face of humanity. And
special being does not mean the individual, identified
by this or that quality which belongs exclusively to it.
On the contrary, it means a being insofar as it is whatever being, a being such that it is. “Whatever being is
desirable” is a tautology. (Agamben, 2007, p. 58)
Agamben opens The Coming Community, as I said, in
an oddly Lacanian way. I said oddly not because it’s odd
to be a Lacanian, but because Agamben is thoroughly
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non-Lacanian here, in Profanations. Below, again, is what
he says in The Coming Community:
Love is never directed toward this or that property of
the loved one, but neither does it neglect the properties in favor of an insipid generality. The lover wants
the loved one with all of its predicates, its being such
as it is. (Agamben, 1993b, pp. 1-2)
If one compares the passages, it’s as though they come
from two different minds. In the first, love is directed
toward the special being, and this is a being that’s common
or generic. In the second, this same idea is derided as “an
insipid generality” toward which, among other things, love
isn’t directed. But where’s the mistake?
The mistake, I think, lies in two places. First, Agamben
has a strange understanding of desire in Profanations. In the
chapter before, he places desire in the realm of images,
what’s in Lacanian parlance the imaginary, in the order of
dualism and identification. Desire actually belongs in the
symbolic. The symbolic order is actually tertiary in structure. The third element is the signifier, that which makes
possible communicative potentiality—this isn’t present in
the imaginary space of images and reflections. Second,
Agamben goes wrong in trying to assimilate special being
to whatever being, this when he had already connected
whatever being to singularity. In other words, he conflated
by association the idea of specialness and singularity.
They’re different.
Admittedly, I had made the same mistake. I had mistaken her for special, but what she is is singular. Special and
species both derive from the Latin spectare, to look.
Agamben knows this, and he’s right to put both in the imaginary order. As I said, he’s gets it wrong only when he puts
desire in the imaginary. It’s identification that has the dualistic character of the look. In identification, the question is,
“Who am I?” This is a question involving specialness.
There’s an ideological pressure to be special, and often,
strangely enough, those who feel the pressure of the question find the look of the other to be invasive. Think of
Beverly Kenney’s poem, for instance. Furthermore, the
question I asked her about the color of the mirror was a
riddle. The answer isn’t a color that’s in the spectrum, for
the mirror is absolutely reflective, and color is the absorption of certain wavelengths. So, like the answer to the riddle
of the Sphinx, the answer here is man. Leclaire knows this,
too. But again, this is the answer for someone asking the
question of a special being, a being who’s spectated, a being
who’s looked at.
The question of someone desiring is different. Here the
signifier is introduced. To borrow a term from Laplanche—
though Lacan wouldn’t necessarily agree—the signifier is
an enigmatic one. In desire, that enigmatic signifier is the
question of, “Who am I for your desire?”

This question mustn’t have an answer. Like the enigma,
it’s a seductive question. Many will try to answer it, but it,
too, is like the question of the Sphinx. If the question is
answered, it’s generally only answered incorrectly. It’s possible that one bores of those who try to answer only ever in
vain. If there’s a correct answer, it mustn’t be spoken. The
answer must be a gesture. Let’s remember that answering
her riddle with discourse was to destroy the Sphinx. So
what’s to be done? Two gestural responses occur to me,
only one of them good.
One thing to do is to merely hear the question. The question may be posed often and in various iterations, but one
can choose to only hear. In other words, one hears with
understanding, but remains unresponsive. This is the irresponsible way. Lovers have responsibility toward each
other, and inattentiveness is a shirking of a duty.
Unresponsiveness might captivate, keep her from becoming
bored, but this isn’t the way of desire.
The other response is to listen to the question. Listening
is an attentiveness. To listen requires the symbolic order,
that which makes communication possible. One should
understand that what the question of desire indexes is a
need for communication, not necessarily the need for an
answer of certitude. Listening is, in fact, responsive communication. It’s responsive communication insofar as the
listener is moved to act upon the said insofar as that listener
strains toward a possible meaning, one that isn’t immediately accessible, one that’s accessible only through the
mediation of the veil. Listening can be a type of waiting.
Furthermore, one must listen until the question no longer
needs to be posed, until communication can achieve a comfortable inoperativity, until there can be laughter because
there’s love.
At bottom, she can stop asking the question of specialness. To be special is to be suffocated by the look. I know
she doesn’t like that. Furthermore, she’s already singular. In
singularity, there’s no pressure to avoid being common, for
the common isn’t merely something in which one partakes,
but creates. It’s from her that originality springs, for within
her is an origin. True, she’ll have the question pertaining to
desire for the next person she’ll be involved with. With
some luck, that person will know how to listen, knowing
that it’s wrong to force her to the other side of the partition
if she isn’t ready to be there. Like the Sphinx, her enigma is
apotropaic, and she should be protective. That’s important.
And last, if I can be allowed one instance of conflating
mythological flying things, both part bird, I hope that she
becomes reborn from the fire that she’s endured. Birds have
song because they belong to the element of the air.
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